John Helmer: Putin Hits Pause Button on Oreshnik-Level Retaliation for Ukraine Strike on Russian Nuclear Deterrence Assets

In his latest talk with Ray McGovern on Dialogue Works, John Helmer gives far and away the best overview¹ so far in the wake of Ukraine attacks on bridges and civilian trains, drone attacks targeting bombers in Russia’s nuclear deterrence forces, a failed new attack on Kerch Bridge, and phone discussions between Lavrov and Rubio and later Trump and Putin.

As you will see, Helmer focuses on whether Russia is about to go to what he calls “the Oreshnik moment,” as in a devastating non-nuclear retaliation. Putin has chosen to put the question in abeyance by depicting the attacks as terrorism, as opposed to acts of war, so as not to trigger an obligation to engage in a strategic response under Russia’s nuclear doctrine. Putin argued that escalating and breaking off negotiations would amount to going in the direction that Kiev and its backers want Russia to take, and by implication this is a trap to be avoided.²

But the issue still remains. As Helmer stated in his accompanying written post:

Now that Putin agrees that in the present war Russia is surrounded by enemies on all sides, and he must make the choice between the “path of struggle” – since Sunday, June 1, this is now war at the point of nuclear arms — and the “path of conciliation” – that’s President Donald Trump’s peace terms – what will Putin decide to do? c

As Helmer explains:

This is important because under the Russian nuclear doctrine of last December section 19c…an attack by a a non-nuclear state on Russia’s nuclear triad. Its capability to deter nuclear attack on Russia is considered a violation of the nuclear deterrence regime and requires under Russian policy a significant strategic level of attack.

Under III. Conditions for the Transition of the Russian Federation to the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, the text of 19c:

19. The conditions that enable the possibility of nuclear weapons employment by the Russian Federation are as follows:…

c) actions by an adversary affecting elements of critically important state or military infrastructure of the Russian Federation, the disablement of which would disrupt response actions by nuclear forces

Please note that Ray McGovern’s view in this talk, that the Ukraine attack did not cross nuclear doctrine red lines, is an extreme outlier among the regular YouTube commentators on this war. But since he regularly tries to object to Helmer’s well-substantiated view, that Ukraine’s attack not just legitimated but even per Russian doctrine, demanded a strategic retaliation, let’s put paid to this matter. We’ll turn the mike over to the fabulously seasoned and cool-headed former ambassador Chas Freeman, from a recent talk on Neutrality Studies, for the widely-shared assessment:

Traditionally the elements of a nuclear deterrent force on both the American and the Soviet side, the Russian side if you will, have been exempt from attack for the very simple reason that both countries regard a an attack with conventional weapons on their nuclear deterrent capacity as equivalent to a nuclear attack and justifying a nuclear response. Both sides take this very seriously. Of course, Ukraine is not part of the SALT agreements, nor is the UK. So, they are free, I suppose, mischievously to challenge this exemption, and they’ve done so, and it’s very dangerous.

In this interview, Nima hoisted remarks by US envoy Keith Kellogg that confirmed this interpretation. ³ Helmer flags US effort by US officials to avoid discussing this and the Bryansk bridge attacks, and worse from a Russian perspective, the resulting failure to condemn them.

To return to Helmer’s theme, of how Russia will respond, he argues:

(at 10:00) This means that Russia will not use the Oreshnik moment to attack at a strategic level. Instead, it’s saying we will subordinate our retaliatory capacity, subordinate it to the negotiations. And I’ve just during the day spoken with my sources in Moscow and what they say is the same. I ask expressly on the issue of “Will there be an Oreshnik retaliation?” My source in a position to know said the launch of the Oreshnik is unlikely [Looks at notes] I’m reading it. Perhaps later “Only if there is certainty that Trump will not deliver. Maybe now a measured strike to help Trump focus.”

If you read Helmer’s article, he presents the text of the relevant section of Russia’s nuclear doctrine and long form substantiates the points:

Also omitted from Russian law is the distinction between acts of terrorism and acts of war… In no other state, either allied with Russia in the present war such as China, Iran and North Korea, or allied with the US and NATO against Russia, is there a law differentiating between state acts of war and state acts of terrorism.

So the normally legalistic Putin is taking some big definitional liberties so as to have a fig leaf for not engaging in a strategic retaliation. What is bothersome is that advocates tend to start believing what they argue on behalf of their causes. Lawyers defending clients they know are guilty regularly come to believe their innocence. Is Putin similarly going to come to believe his minimization of these attacks?

But the immediate question is why Russia is holding back from establishing that it has escalation dominance without resorting to nuclear weapons. One factor may be, as Larry Wilkerson discussed in a recent interview we highlighted, that the direction of travel is that the US will hit the limits of its escalation ladder (with many not even fully grasping that Russia both outperforms the West in most weapons categories and can greatly outproduce the West too) it will go for a nuclear attack, and Russia is keenly aware of that.

However, Helmer points out in his related article (and he didn’t have a chance to cover this in the interview) that the Kremlin is simply giving Trump the opportunity to deliver on the latest Russian memorandum presented in Istanbul (see the terms here):

The source explains Putin’s decision-making. “The political functionaries [Kremlin, Foreign Ministry] have their focus on the Memorandum and expect it will be signed. Now we wait for Trump to deliver. Rubio sent [Senator Lindsey] Graham to [Vladimir] Zelensky to accept it. He talks best with Zelensky. Our side has some more patience before replying to the ‘terror attacks’ [sarcastic laughter]. This is because all the assurance we have from the Americans is that the outcome of discussions will be positive. A Russian military response of large proportions can wait. We have patience. It will happen if [emphasis] Trump will not deliver Ukraine on Memorandum-1.” How long will the Kremlin give Trump? the source was asked. “Several weeks, not months.”

This forbearance is unpopular within Russia, as Helmer⁴ and even readers have indicated, even with the effort to underplay its seriousness.

In our post on Larry Wilkerson’s reaction to the drone strikes, we ventured that Russia would not retaliate for several weeks so as to let the negotiations play out. Russia has made a point of observing forms. Why rush when time is in its favor? A delay of weeks not only allows them to chew up more of Ukraine, but if they opt for massive strikes, to better pre-position troops and materiel to take advantage of it.

Helmer describes what the public and private official Russian positions are. I will turn to a glaring contraction, of Helmer’s insistence in this and earlier talks, that Russia is testing the US, with the fact that he also points out that Russian officials, as they have repeatedly stated, at length, with vigor, and with receipts, that the US it totally, top to bottom untrustworthy. So why bother testing when you know the answer?

Helmer is far too smart not to recognize this conundrum, but perhaps he has reasons for not questioning what he had been told. I will considering this matter after more discussion of the state of play, particularly the Trump call to Putin.

The guilty silence from the US side is telling. The State Department provided an uninformative readout save registering that Lavrov initiated the call. The Russian readout shows that Rubio gave his condolences for the victims of the Bryansk bridge attack. But the Lavrov call came within hours of the Ukraine drone attack, and the fact that Rubio took in in the wee AM is an indicator that the US knew this scheme had gone pear-shaped and it was faced with answering to Russia somehow.

One is hard pressed to make any sense of what Trump says. After all, he and Putin had call both sides regarded as friendly and productive on May 19,. Less than two weeks later, Trump is calling Putin crazy, made a threat, and pretended not to know about the Putin assassination attempt. That was followed by a barrage of intended-to-be-extremely serious attacks by the US proxy that fell short.

Whatever Lavrov said to Rubio likely induced Trump to call:

As Larry Wilkerson points out, Trump is acting chastened, and I put more emphasis on “acting” that Johnson does. From his post:

Here is what I think really happened… Lavrov, at the direction of Vladimir Putin, called Rubio to deliver a stern message and a warning to President Trump….the Russian government was prepared to take strong action because the attack on the airfields represented a direct threat to Russia’s nuclear capabilities… Russia is going to punish Ukraine and any countries that provided assistance, whether materiel or intelligence, to this act of war.

The next day, June 2nd, Russia’s lead negotiator, Vladimir Medinsky, met with Ukraine’s Defense Minister, Rustem Enverovych Umerov, in advance of the formal meeting between the delegations of the two countries. Medinsky delivered an ultimatum to Umerov, i.e., this is your last chance to accept this deal or face worse consequences.

Trump was uncharacteristically silent on social media on Monday and Tuesday. I believe that he was alarmed by Lavrov’s message…

We got our first clue on Tuesday, when Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced he would not attend the June 4 meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG). Secretary Hegseth’s absence from the June 4, 2025, meeting in Brussels marked the first time a US defense chief did not participate in a UDCG session. Hegseth did not attend the previous gathering in person, but he did make a Zoom appearance

This may also explain the odd appearance of a lead Bloomberg story on June 4, Exclusive: US Said to Deny Air Cover to Europe Force in Postwar Ukraine, Its opening paragraphs:

The US is refusing to provide air defenses to back the “reassurance force” the UK and France are planning in a postwar Ukraine, people familiar with the matter said.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has insisted a US so-called backstop is essential to deter Russia from breaching any future ceasefire deal. But European allies have concluded during discussions with their American counterparts that President Donald Trump won’t provide the guarantees they have sought to back the Europe-led ‘coalition of the willing,’ according to the people, who requested anonymity disclosing private discussions.

Mind you, the US has already said no to this sort of entreaty. So why has this come up again? It appears that these EU leaders went again to the US, hoping that the drone attacks had been enough of a demonstration of Russian weakness so as to persuade Trump to change his mind.

But how long does this new-found probity last? One guesses at best until German Chancellor Freirich Merz visits him next week.

So why is Russia going through this elaborate charade of treating the US as if it could deliver on Russia’s demands? As Chas Freeman said,

What came out of this meeting in Istanbul is an exchange of memoranda outlining the positions of the two sides. That makes it apparent that there is absolutely no possibility of a meeting of the minds.

I cannot begin to make sense of Trump’s remarks on Iran. Admittedly, I am overly reliant on Professor Mirandi, but he was part of the team that negotiated the JCPOA. Mirandi has said that Iran would not want Russia to intermediate in talks with the US, and that Russia would not want to be in that position either.

And as with the Ukraine-Russia talks, the two sides are at an impasse. The Supreme Leader has rejected the US demand for no nuclear enrichment. No amount of Putin sweet-talking, even if he were to stoop to do that, would change things. And why exactly should he do the US a solid now?

Moreover, as Helmer pointed out, Russia is well aware of the fact that there are deep divisions in the Administration. More specifically, Trump put neocons in key positions and despite having purges underway, they are still very influential. Look at how when Keith Kellogg was supposed demoted to baby-sitting Zelensky, he’s managed to become the key US advisor. Recall Steve Witkoff was displaced after Putin refused to see him. That in turn was because Witkoff had become the bearer of the 22 point memorandum devised by Kellogg and friends, and could not be seen as an emissary for Trump.

In addition, Lindsay Graham is globetrotting like a wannabe Godzilla on an international tour, threatening his bone-crushing sanctions. One has to note this is actually progress of sorts. Someone must have given the memo to Graham that the US cannot meaningfully arm Ukraine, so at least he’s not trumping for big weapons packages.

However, Graham claims he has 80 votes in the Senate. That’s enough to remove Trump from office if articles of impeachment were to get to the Senate. That risk may seem remote now, but a lot of things are going pear-shaped for Trump.

So let us return to the contradiction of Putin wanting to test Trump when Russia knows full well that the US and even more so Trump, cannot be trusted. So what is the point of any test?

The test may not be of reliability, but testing for strength, as in intensifying pressures so as to see when and where fractures occur. For instance, Trump does not like being pushed around by neocons even though he still lets himself be influenced by them. Playing the negotiation game flatters Trump and should help him, even if only at the margin, in trying to reduce the neocon’s power.

Trump already loathes European leaders for having themselves or their predecessors treat him shabbily during Trump 1.0 while being ungrateful for US defense protection. Yet Trump has been threatening to leave them to their own devices, military and especially Ukraine-wise, while being very slow to take steps to operationalize that, as armed services types might say. The European leaders are particularly upset that the negotiations are happening at all. So keeping them going, even if on life support, also increases pressure on the US-Europe fault line.

Another reason for Russia to continue with attrition, albeit intensified, for a few weeks or even a bit more, is the very Iran issue that Trump mentioned. Netanyahu is just as desperate to get the US involved on his side as Zelensky in Ukraine, with far better ability to make that happen. Earlier this year, when Israel was working on a joint US-Israel strike package that Trump nixed, there were reports that Israel saw its window for action as late spring-early summer. That was linked to the expiration of the snapback provisions in the JCPOA (any procedure would have to start before the end of June so as to be completed before the expiration date in October). That presumably means a deal needs to be “done” by then or the US loses its leverage. And Netanyahu’s ever-weakening domestic position also creates a sense of urgency.

In other words, Putin’s lame terrorism positioning may have been his cleanest excuse to wait to see if Israel does attack Iran, since that clock is very much ticking. If so, the US will have to Do Something and NATO will be roped in to assist (recall that the UK and France participated in the $2.3 billion defense against Iran’s negotiated and scheduled attack on Israel that cost Iran only $90 million). So Russia would have a much freer hand in the scale and scope of its drone attack retaliation, and even more important, how it moved ground forces to capitalize on that.

Let us put this another way: Ukraine is about finished. There are gaps in its manning in the line of contact. Russia crossed the Oskil River unopposed. There are reports of panic among Ukraine soliders due to the advances in Sumy. This series of attacks are recklessly desperate, wild punches by Ukraine. The one last boost it might get is using Taurus missiles, which do have a longer range, of 500km, than previous Western missiles.

But Germany can provide only 150. They have to be air launched, presumably from F-16, which have been notably missing in action, apparently due to the ease of Russian interception. Yes, a few might get through. But this is a self-limited threat. And Russia does not have to exact its revenge quickly, given that Germany is a paper tiger.

Helmer said Russia sees the US as playing a double game, as if its chaos and incompetence even rises to the level of a game. Think Russia isn’t playing one too? Even with Helmer having excellent sources, key fact and plans are likely very closely held.

My best guess is Russia recognizes it needs to break NATO and is not yet willing to admit to that as its real aim. And in any event, it has to break Ukraine. So first things first. The process of subjugating Ukraine will weaken NATO and will increase all sorts of splits (imagine the recriminations and blame shifting). Russia will get all sorts of information from that process as to how to proceed next.

_____

¹Helmer refers specifically to details of documents and speeches, and also unlike pretty much all Western YouTube commentators, has access to high-level sources in Russia, including on the General Staff.

² The fact that Kiev might think this is a trap in its game of information warfare does not mean that an assessment of risks and benefits means Russia should refrain from retaliation for that reason. I can see the point in Scott Ritter terms, that Russia does not want Ukraine driving its OODA loop. But that does not argue for no retaliation, just no immediate retaliation. Russia should pick advantageous times and means.

³ See at 28:30:

Kellogg: What happened this weekend..people have to understand in the national security space when you attack uh an opponent’s part of their national survival system which is their triad the nuclear triad that means your risk level goes up because you don’t know what the other side’s going to do. You’re not sure. And that’s what they actually did. And the one that really concerned me was the fact that there may have been reports uh that they attacked the naval the northern fleet headquarters in Severomorsk . And if that’s the case, if when you attack two legs of a triad that first of all, it was a very bold attack. Um and when you do that, it’s very clear the risk levels will go up. And I think that’s what we’re trying to avoid. We’re trying to get to a position where the risk levels have blown so high that this thing will expand and actually where we don’t want to be.

Helmer pointed out the attack on the fleet did not happen.

⁴ Helmer’s examples:

Moskovsky Komsomolets, a mass circulation newspaper and tribune of popular opinion, has called for the same “determination and harshness” against Ukraine as Israel has shown against Hamas. Boris Rozhin, speaking for the Russian military opinion and editor-in-chief of the widely read military blog, Colonel Cassad, said: “I hope that the military-political leadership will find a way to adequately respond. The blow should be painful… As long as we are waging a limited war, the enemy is waging a total war, the purpose of which is the destruction of our country and people. And no peace talks will change this. The longer it is in coming, the more unpleasant surprises.”